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RECENT CASES
ASSIGNMENTS--CHECKS-EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT.-CENTRAL BANK &
TRUST Co. v. DAvis, 149 S. W., 290 (TEx.)-Held, that in general, the
drawing of a check on a general deposit bank account is not a pro tanto
assignment of the account so as to authorize the holder to sue the bank
in his own name.
On this question whether a check on a general deposit account amounts
to an equitable assignment there seems to be an irreconcilable conflict of
authorities. The folldwing cases are in accord with the leading case:
Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U. S., 385; Bank v. Clark, 134 N. Y., 368; Carr
v. Bank, 107 Mass., 45; Brennan v. Bank, 62 Mich., 343; Harrison v.
Wright, 100 Ind., 515. Contra, Ins. Co. v. Peck, 102 Ill., 265; Bank v.
Newland, 97 Ky., 464; Hawes v. Blackwell, 107 N. C., 196; Stewart v'
Smith, 31 Neb., 107. Many cases state squarely that after presentation
and demand, the holder may sue in his own name, if the drawer had funds
to meet the check. Lester & Co. v. Given, 71 Ky., 357; Gordon and Gomila
v. MiUchler, 34 La. Ann., 604; Forgarties v. Bank, 78 Am. Dec., 468 (S. C.).
It is, however, generally held that an order on a specific fund amounts to
an equitable assignment. Bank v. Sprattcn, 43 Pac., 1048 (Col.); Phelps v.
Northrup, 56 Ill., 156; Dolese v. McDougall, 182 Ill., 486. But this ques-
tion, too, has been decided the other way. Roselle Park v. Montgomery,
60 Atl., 954 (N. J.). At least where the order is for part of the fund only.
and unaccepted. R. R. v. A. .M. Wright Co., 38 Mo. App., 141. Though if
accepted, it is an assignment. Bourne v. Cabot, 3 Mete., 305. It has been
held that the fund is sufficiently specified if designated orally after the
written order. McDaniell v. Maxwell, 21 Ore., 202; Bank v. Kimberlands,
16 W. Va., 555. A valuable collection of the authorities on the subject may
be found in Varley v. Sims, 100 Minn., 331.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY-EXTENUATION OR
JUSTIFICATION.-SPEAR V. STATE, 57 SOU. (ALA.), 510.-Held, that under the
Code, providing that accused, on a trial for assault, assault and battery, or
affray, may prove in extenuation or justification abusive language by prose-
cutor at or near the time of the offense, abusive language by prosecutor. at
or near the time of assault, not in the presence or hearing of accused, but
communicated to him before the assault, may be proved in extenuation or
justification.
At common law, no words, however opprobrious, disgraceful, annoying
or vexatious, will justify an assault or battery. People v. Moore, 3 Wheel.
Crim. (N. Y.), 82; State v. Workman, 39 S. C., 161. In some jurisdictions
however, such words are held1 to mitigate the penalty. State v. Harrington,
21 Ark., 195; State v. Kaiser, 78 Mo. App., 575. In Alabama and Georgia,
it has been enacted by statute that where such words were uttered in the
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presence of the accused they may constitute an absolute defense. Roger; v,
State, 117 Ala., 192; Murphy v. State, 92 Ga,, 75, But under these statutes
resentment disproportionate to the provocation is not justifiable. Holland v,
State, 103 Ga., 3; Taylor v. State, 48 Ala,, 180. As when the person
accused of an assault has given first blow, he cannot plead self-defense, s,
if he first use opprobrious words, he cannot claim their use by another as
a defense. Brown v. State, 74 Ala., 42; Arnold , Stat, 46 Ga., 455, The
words claimed as a defense must have been used at the time of the assault;
that they were published in a newspaper is not sufficiert, Berry v, State,
105 Ga., 683. Gestures, grimaces and other facial contortions, indicative
of contempt or derision, do not come within the scope of these ptatutes,
Behling v. State, 110 Ga., 592, As compared with these authorities, the
principal case seems to go a long way in Its interpretation of the Code
provision.
CRIMINAL LAW-PREJUDICIAL ERRoR-BTJWEN oF SHowING RO.---
ARMSTRONG V. STATE, 144 S. W., 195 (ARN.),--Held, on appeal from a conr
viction for a felony, the burden is'on the State to show that no prejudice
resulted to accused through a juror being permitted to go home during the
trial unaccompanied by an officer. McCulloch, C. J,, d#ijenting,
The principal case is in accord with the view that a presumption of
injury to the accused arises from the mere fact of a separation of the
jury, although it does not.appear affirmatively that the accused was in fact
prejudiced. People v. Thornton, 74 Cal., 482; Daniel v, State, 56 ga., 653;
Parker v. State, 18 Ohio St., 88. In some of the earlier decisions a new
trial was held proper if the jurors were separated and became accessible
to outside influence, whether the interests of the accused were prejudiced
or not. Maher v. State, 3 Minn., 444; McLean v. State, 8 Mo, 153, The
weight of authority now is that a new trial will be granted In the absence
of an affirmative showing that the interests of the accused were not In fact
prejudiced. Williams v. Sate, 45 Ala., 57; People v, BRmmerly, 98 Cal,, 9.
But a number of cases hold directly that the fact of the jurors separation
is not ground for a new trial unless it appear that the accused was preju-
diced, the ground for the dissenting opinion in the principal case. State v.
Griffin, 71 Ia., 372; State v. Dugan, 52 Kan., 23; State v, Muller, 18 N, C,
500. Some States by statute make the separation of the jury in itself
ground for a new trial. State v. McNeil, 59 Kan., 599; State v. Orrick, 106
Mo., 111. But in the absence of statute it appears to be universally held
that if it aTirmati-ely appear that the accused was not prejudiced there is
no ground for a new trial. People v. Wheatley, 88 Cal,, 114; Robinson V,
State, 109 Ga., 506.
CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL-ARGumENT OF CouNsEL.-FAN m Y. STATE, 58
Sou. (Miss.), 2-Held, that in a prosecution for murder, argument of the
district attorney calling the attention of the jury-to the fact that the wife of
the defendant had not testified, that the State could n6t introduce her as a
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witness, but that the defendant could, and his failure to do so could be
accounted for only on the ground that her evidence wpould show him guilty
of murder, was improper.
At common law, it was the rule that neither husband nor wife was
competent to bear testimony at the trial of the other. Fink v. Denny, 75
Va., 663; Moffatt v. Moffatt, 10 Bosw. (N. Y.), 468; Snyder v. Snyder,
6 Bing. (Pa.), 483. In most cases when one spouse is offered as a witness
against the other, the incompetency is more a matter of disability than of
privilege. Brock v. State, 44 Tex. Crim., 335. But at common law no
apparent distinction is made between the two. People v. Mercein, 8 Paige
(N. Y.), 47; Tucker v. State, 71 Ala., 342. Under the early statutory
change of the common law rule, the courts interpreted the failure of the
spouse accused to call the other to the stand as a ground for an inference
of guilt. The leading case upon this is State v. Bartlett, 65 Me., 200. See
also Wigmore on Evidence, vol. iv, p. 3144. But it was subsequently gen-
erally enacted by statute that no such inference should be drawn, the
same rule applying to the failure of the accused to take the stand in his
own behalf, and to his failure to call his spouse to the stand. For a digest
of such statutes, see Wigniore, vol. i, p. 488. Under such statutes it has
been held that a failure of accused to testify or to call spouse to stand as
witness must not be commented upon by counsel. Cooper v. State, 86 Ala.,
610; People v. Tyler, 36 Cal., 522. But in Texas, where the wife was the
sole witness of a homicide, it was held that her failure to testify could be
commented on. McMitchell v. State, 49 Tex. Crim., 422. The holding of
the principal case seems to carry out the true spirit of the statute. If the
failure of the husband to call his wife as a witness in his behalf were to
be construed as a circumstance against him, his privilege in the matter
would be annulled, and he would be compelled, in all cases, to introduce
her or run the risk of being convicted on an implied admission.
DAMAGES-BREACH OF CONTRACT-IMENTAL ANGUISH.-BROWNING V.
FIEs, 58 Sou. (ALA,), 931.-Held, that where a liveryman failed to supply
the plaintiff with a carriage as contracted, knowing that the plaintiff wished
it to carry him to his wedding, damages for "mental anguish" are recover-
able in an action for breach of contract.
It is a well established rule that mental distress, disconnected with
physical suffering, has no place as an element of the damages recoverable
upon a breach of contract. Wilcox v. Richiond & D. R. Co., 52 Fed., 264;
Connell v. Western U. T. Co., 3 Dak., 315. Yet many jurisdictions allow
recovery for the mental distress and humiliation attendant upon the breach
of the contract of carriage by the wrongful expulsion of a passenger from
the vehicle of a carrier. Allen v. Camden, etc., Co., 46 N.J. L., 198; Jones v.
Texas, etc., R. Co., 23 Tex., Civ. App., 65. And in a similar way, by the
so-called "Texas rule", when a telegraph company fails by reason of its
own negligence to deliver as contracted a message although it was known
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that such failure might prove to be the proximate cause of mental distress,
damages for the distress so caused are recoverable, in an action on the
breach in several jurisdictions. Chapman v. Western U. T. Co., 90 Ky., 265;
Vadsworth v. Western U. T. Co., 86 Tenn., 695. Moreover, damages for
mental distress are generally recoverable in an action for the breach of the
contract of marriage. Coolidge v. Neat, 129 Mass., 146; Vanderpool v.
Richardson, 52 Mich., 336. A few jurisdictions, however, carry this doc-
trine beyond the exceptions mentioned, while the others refuse to extend
the principle not so much because of disapproval of the theories involved
as from fear lest the amount and complexity of litigation be unduly
increased. Dunn & Co. v. Smith, 74 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.), 576; Lewis v.
Holmes, 109 La., 1030. See Yale Law Journal, vol. xxi, pp. 243, 685, where
similar cases are discussed.
HOMICIDE-EVIDENcE-DYING STATE.MENTS-ADMItSSIBILITY.-JOHNSON
V. STATE, 149 S. W., 165 (TEx.).-Held, that statements as to the fatal dif-
ficulty, made by deceased after he had stated that he believed he he was
going to die, and had remarked, "Doctor, you are too late", and when it
did not appear that he had any hope of recovery, and while he was sane,
and made without persuasion or in answer to interrogatories to lead him to
make any particular statement, were admissible as dying declarations.
All authorities uphold the general rule as established by the main case,
that statements made by deceased when in extremis as to circumstances of
his injuries with knowledge of impending death are admissible. Jones v.
State, 71 Ind., 66; State v. Craine, 120 N. C., 601. But if there is any
expectation or hope of recovery, however, slight, and though death actually
ensued immediately afterwards, the declaration is inadmissible. Cont. v.
Roberts, 108 Mass., 296. The revival of hope after making declaration,
does not affect the admissibility. State v. Reed, 53 Kans., 767. But declar-
ant's mere statement of no hope of recovery is not conclusive. Bell v. State,
72 Miss., 507. However, it is not necessary that he express belief that he
will die. Wills v. State, 74 Ala., 21; People v. Gray, 61 Cal., 164. His
knowledge of impending death may be inferred from surrounding circum-
stances. People v. Chase, 79 Hun. (N. Y.), 296. But belief must not be
merely in ultimate death. Starr v. Con., 97 Ky., 193. And it is immaterial
that statements were made in answer to questions propounded. People v.
Knapp, 26 Mich., 112. Of course, whatever is receivbale to affect the
credibility of a person's testimony may be received to affect that of his
dying declarations. Carver v. U. S., 164 U. S., 694. And it is now firmly
established that dying declarations are admissible only in cases of homicide,
when the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the cir-
cumstances of the death, the subject of the statements. People v. Davis,
56 N. Y., 95. Nor would these declarations have been excluded if there
had been eye witnesses to the deed, or other testimony. People v. Beverly,
108 Mich., 509.
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LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-PRvATE NUISANCE-SOUTHERN Ry. Co. v.
MCMENAMIN, 73 S. E., 980 (VA.).-Held, that a railroad is a permanent
structure, and, where it is a nuisance, there is only one right of action
therefor, which will be barred within the statutory period, and the entire
damage suffered both past and future must be recovered in one action.
Where a railroad is constructed by lawful authority and is not operated
in a negligent or unlawful manner, it is not a nuisance to an adjoining
landowner. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Heisel, 38 Mich., 62; Beseinan vu.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 50 N. J. Law, 235. But the company cannot escape
from liability for damage caused by the improper location and maintenance
of structures which are incidental to the ordinary operation of the road.
Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S., 317; Garvey v.
Long Island R. Co., 159 N. Y., 323. And where a structure of this nature
is permanent but shelters a nuisance which is transient and recurrent, suc-
cessive actions may be brought for each recurrence of the consequent injury
and the Statute of Limitations will run only from the time of the respec-
tive recurrences. City Council of Augusta v.'Lombard, 101 Ga., 724; Ster-
rett v. Northport, etc., Co., 30 Wash., 164. There is considerable author-
ity in support of the doctrine of the principal case that where the original
nuisance is of a permanent character, so that the damage inflicted thereby
will be permanent in all probability, recovery for damages past and future
must be had in a single action, which is deemed to have accrued when the
nuisance was created. Powers v. Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa, 652; Chicago,
etc., R. Co. v. McAuley, 121 Ill., 160; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson,
62 Ark., 360. But even where this doctrine has'been recognized, there has
been a strong tendency to restrict its application by narrowing the defini-
tion of permanent nuisances. Petit v. Green County Grand Junction, 119
Iowa, 352; Baker v. Leka, 48 Ill. App., 353. In most jurisdictions, how-
ever, this rule requiring all damages to be recovered in a single action, has
not been accepted. Aldworth v. Lynn, 153 Mass., 53; Doran v. Seattle, 24
Wash., 182. It would seem, nevertheless, that the doctrine of the prin-
cipal case, though supported by a minority of authority, is preferable, in
that in such cases where the nuisance is reasonably sure to prove recur-
rent, litigation is restricted to a single action instead of being extended
indefinitely to a series of suits of a similar character.
RELEASE-JOINT TORT-1EASORS.-FLYNN v. MANSON, 126 PAC., 181
(CAL.).-Held, a release of one of several wrongdoers from liability
releases his co-defendants, though the release recites that it is not claim-
ant's intention that it so operate.
It is a generally recognized rule of law that a technical release under
seal to one of the wrongdoers will bar recovery against the other, Rogers
v. Cox, 66 N. J. L., 432, and this is so even though the release expressly
stipulated that it was to apply to no one except the one to whom it was
given. Gunthcr v. Lee, 45 Md., 60. An unconditional written release not
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under seal, will have the same effect. Aldrich v. Parnell, 147 Mass., 409;
Ayer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447, and oral testimony is inadmissible to.
change the effect of such an instrument. Goss v. Ellison, 136 Mass,, 503,
In accordance with the positiontaken in the principal case, it is quite gen-
erally held that an express stipulation that it shall not have that effect is
of no avail. ,Abb v. No. Pac. R. R., 28 Wash., 428; McBride v. Scott, 132
Mich., 176; Dulaney v. Buffun, 173 Mo., 1. Yet in Walsh v. N. Y. C. &
H. R. R., 140 N. Y. App., 1, and in Carey v Bilby, 129 Fed., 203, such an
instrument was regarded as a covenant not to sue, and a covenant not to
sue does not operate as a release. Texarkana Tel. Co. v. Pemberton, 86
Ark., 330. There is a tendency in some jurisdictions to allow the inten-
tion of the parties to regulate the extent to which a release not under seal
shall be given effect, Bloss v. Plymale, 3 W. Va., 393, and it will not oper-
ate as a release where the instrument shows it was not intended to have
that effect. Edens v. Fletcher, 79 Kan., 139. In Fitgerald v. Stockyards,
89 Neb., 393, it was held not to be a release unless it was agreed between
the parties that payment was in full for all damages suffered, and parol
evidence is admissible to show the real intention. Where the release is of
one not shown to be a wrongdoer it will not operate to discharge the
others who are responsible. Western Tub. Co. v. Zang, 85 Ill. App., 63;
Thomas v. Central R. R. Co., 194 Pa., 511. Even under such circum-
stances it has been given the effect of a release by some courts. Miller v.
Beck & Co., 108 La., 575; Hartigan v. Dickson, 81 Minn., 284.
WITNESSES-CRoss-EXAMINATION TO INDICATE As.-WIEAT V. STATE,
57 So., 68 (ALA.).-Held, it is proper to ask a prosecutrix on cross-exam-
ination if she is not "mad" with defendant because-he has a mortgage on
her property.
A wide latitude of construction is applied in the application of the
rule that it is always competent to show the hostility of a witness to a
party against whom he is testifying; it being essential for the jury to
differentiate between a biased and indifferent witness. Daggett v. Tollman,
8 Conn., 168; Bishop v. State, 9 Ga., 121; John Morris Co. v. Burgess, 44
Ill. App., 27. It is held that any question that may have a tendency to
show bias is allowable on cross-examination. State v. Krum, 32 Kan., 372.
But the extent to which the examination may go to show bias rests within
the discretion of the trial judge. State v. May, 172 Mo., 630; People v.
Brooks, 131 N. Y., 321. The authorities are consistent that a clear oppor-
tunity should be accorded counsel to show the nature and extent of the
animosity on the part of the witness. People v. Bird, 124 Cal., 32; Blan-
chard v. Blanchard, 191 Ill., 450. A witness may be properly asked
whether he and accused are not on unfriendly terms because of a bill the
witness owes defendant. Sanford. v. State, 143 Ala., 78. The fact that the
witness is interested in defendant corporation is admissible to show bias.
Preferred Ace. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Gray, 123 Ala., 482. But it is error to
permit on cross-examination a question that only humiliates a witness, the
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zanswer to which could show no possible favorable bias. Adkinson v. State,
-48 Fla., 1. The rule that a witness may be cross-examined as to collateral
matters to show bias does not apply where the witness is a party. Carr v.
Smith, 129 N. C., 232. Neither is it competent to prove the bias of a
witness by the cross-examination of another 'Witness without having cross-
examined the first witness as to his prejudice. Davis v. State, 51 Neb., 301.
